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Abstract
Finite population non-cooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player de-
cides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payo¤ com-
plementarities, together with a globally uniform payo¤ substitutability component and an own-
concavity e¤ect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is proportional to
her Bonacich centrality in the network of local complementarities, thus establishing a bridge with
the sociology literature on social networks. This Bonacich-Nash linkage implies that aggregate
equilibrium increases with network size and density. We then analyze a policy that consists of
targeting the key player, that is, the player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in
aggregate activity. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identi…ed with an
inter-centrality measure, which takes into account both a player’s centrality and her contribution
to the centrality of the others.
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11 Introduction
The dependence of individual outcomes on group behavior is often referred to as peer e¤ects in the
literature.1 In standard peer e¤ects models, this dependence is homogeneous across members, and
corresponds to an average group in‡uence. Technically, the marginal utility to one person of under-
taking an action is a function of the average amount of the action taken by her peers. Generative
models of peer e¤ects, though, suggest that this intragroup externality is, in fact, heterogeneous
across group members,2 and varies across individuals with their level of group exposure.
In this paper, we allow for a general pattern of bilateral in‡uences, and analyze the resulting
dependence of individual outcome on group behavior.
More precisely, consider a …nite population of players with linear-quadratic interdependent
utility functions. Take the matrix of cross derivatives in these players’ utilities. Our …rst task
is to decompose additively this matrix of cross e¤ects into an idiosyncratic component, a global
interaction component, and a local interaction network. The idiosyncratic e¤ect re‡ects (part of)
the concavity of the payo¤ function in own e¤orts. The global interaction e¤ect is uniform across all
players, and re‡ects a strategic substitutability in e¤orts across all pairs of players. Finally, the local
interaction component re‡ects a (relative) strategic complementarity in e¤orts that varies across
pairs of players. The population wide pattern of these local complementarities is well-captured by
a network. This description allows for a clear view of global and local externalities and their sign
for a given general pattern of interdependencies.
Based on this reformulation, the paper provides three main results. First, we relate individual
equilibrium outcomes to the players’ positions in the network of local interactions. Second, we show
that the aggregate equilibrium outcome increases with the density and size of the local interaction
network. Finally, we characterize an optimal network disruption policy that exploits the geometric
intricacies of this network structure.
In network games, the payo¤ interdependence is, at least in part, rooted in the network structure
of players’ links.3 In these games, equilibrium strategies, that subsume the payo¤ interdependence
in a consistent manner, should naturally re‡ect the players’ network embeddedness. When the
relative magnitude of global and local externalities for our decomposition of cross e¤ects scale
adequately, our network game has a unique and interior Nash equilibrium, proportional to the
Bonacich network centrality. This measure has been proposed for nearly two decades in sociology
by Bonacich (1987), and counts the number of all paths4 emanating from a given node, weighted
by a decay factor that decreases with the length of these paths.5 This is intuitively related to the
1Durlauf (2004) o¤ers an exhaustive survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on peer e¤ects.
2For instance, when job information ‡ows through friendship links, employment outcomes vary across otherwise
identical agents with their location in the network of such links (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004).
3See, in particular, the recent literature survey by Jackson (2004).
4Not just shortest paths.
5It was originally interpreted as an index of in‡uence or power of the actors of a social network. Katz (1953) is a
2equilibrium behavior, as the paths capture all possible feedbacks. In our case, the decay factor
depends on how others’ actions enter into own action’s payo¤.
The sociology literature on social networks is well-established and extremely active (see, in
particular, Wasserman and Faust, 1994). One of the focus of this literature is, precisely, to propose
di¤erent measures of network centralities and to assert the descriptive and/or prescriptive suitability
of each of these measures to di¤erent situations.6 This paper provides a behavioral foundation to
the Bonacich’s index, thus singling it out from the vast catalogue of network measures.
The relationship between equilibrium strategic behavior and network topology given by the
Bonacich measure allows for a general comparative statics exercise. We show that a denser and
larger network of local interactions increases the aggregate equilibrium outcome. This is simply
because the aggregate number of network paths increase with the number of available connections.
When the Nash-Bonacich linkage holds, the variance of equilibrium actions re‡ects the variance
of network centralities. In this case, a planner may want to remove a few suitably selected targets
from the local interaction network, so as to alter the whole distribution of outcomes. To characterize
the network optimal targets, we propose a new measure of network centrality, the inter-centrality
measure, that does not exist in the social network literature. Players with the highest inter-
centrality are the key players whose removal results in the maximal decrease in overall activity.
Contrary to the Bonacich centrality measure, this new centrality measure does not derive
from strategic (individual) considerations, but from the planner’s optimality (collective) concerns.
Bonacich centrality fails to internalize all the network payo¤ externalities agents exert on each
other, while the inter-centrality measure internalizes them all. Indeed, removing a player from a
network has two e¤ects. First, less players contribute to the aggregate activity level (direct ef-
fect), and second, the network topology is modi…ed, the remaining players thus adopting di¤erent
actions (indirect e¤ect). As such, the inter-centrality measure accounts not only for individual
Bonacich centralities but also for cross-contributions across them. In particular, the key player is
not necessarily the player with the highest equilibrium outcome.
Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3 contains the equilibrium analysis, and Section 4 the
network-based policy. Section 5 contains a number of applications, including crime networks, R&D
collaboration links in oligopoly markets, and conformist behavior. Section 6 discusses a number of
extensions.
seminal reference.
6See Borgatti (2003) for a discussion on the lack of a systematic criterium to pick up the “right” network centrality
measure for each particular situation.
32 The model
2.1 The game
Each player i = 1;:::;n selects an e¤ort xi ¸ 0, and gets a payo¤ ui(x1;:::;xn). We focus on bilinear
payo¤ functions of the form:
ui(x1;:::;xn) = ®ixi +
1
2
¾iix2
i +
X
j6=i
¾ijxixj; (1)
strictly concave in one’s e¤ort, that is, @2ui=@x2
i = ¾ii < 0. We set ®i = ® > 0 and ¾ii = ¾,
identical for all players. Net of bilateral in‡uences, players have thus the same payo¤s.
Bilateral in‡uences are captured by the cross derivatives @2ui=@xi@xj = ¾ij, i 6= j. They depend
on the pair of players considered, and can be of either sign. When ¾ij > 0, an increase in e¤ort from
j triggers a downwards shift in i’s response. We say that e¤orts are strategic complements from i’s
perspective within the pair (i;j). Reciprocally, when ¾ij < 0, e¤orts are strategic substitutes from
i’s perspective within the pair (i;j).
Let ¾ = minf¾ij j i 6= jg and ¾ = max f¾ij j i 6= jg.
We assume that ¾ < minf¾;0g. When ¾ ¸ 0, this is simply the concavity of payo¤s in own
e¤orts. When ¾ < 0, this requires that own marginal returns decrease with the level of xi at least
as much as cross marginal returns do.
Let § = [¾ij] be the square matrix of cross e¤ects:
§ =
2
6 6
4
¾11 ¢¢¢ ¾1n
. . .
...
. . .
¾n1 ¢¢¢ ¾nn
3
7 7
5:
We use § as a short-hand for the simultaneous move n¡player game with payo¤s (1) and
strategy spaces IR+.
2.2 The decomposition of cross e¤ects
We decompose the matrix § additively into an idiosyncratic concavity component, a global (uni-
form) substitutability component, and a local complementarity component, in the following way.
Let ° = ¡minf¾;0g ¸ 0. If e¤orts are strategic substitutes for some pair of players, then ¾ < 0
and ° > 0. Otherwise, ¾ ¸ 0 and ° = 0. As we shall see below, the parameter ° accounts for the
global substitutability of e¤orts across all pairs of players.
Let ¸ = ¾ + ° ¸ 0. We assume that ¸ > 0. This is a generic property, as ¸ = 0 if and
only if ¾ = ¾, and this equality is not robust to small perturbations of the coe¢cients ¾ and
¾.7 Let also gij = (¾ij + °)=¸, for i 6= j, and set gii = 0. By construction, 0 · gij · 1. The
7The set of parameters ¾ijs for which ¾= ¾ has Lebesgue measure zero in IR
n(n¡1).
4parameter gij measures the relative complementarity in e¤orts from i’s perspective within the pair
(i;j) with respect to the benchmark value ¡° · 0. This measure is expressed as a fraction of ¸,
that corresponds to the highest possible relative complementarity for all pairs.
The decomposition is depicted in Figure 1. This is just a centralization (¯ and ¸ are de…ned
with respect to °) followed by a normalization (the gijs are in [0;1]) of the cross e¤ects. The …gure
in the upper panel corresponds to ¾ij of either sign (the case ¾ij · 0, for all i 6= j is similar) while
the …gure in the lower panel corresponds to ¾ij ¸ 0, for all i 6= j (recall that we assume ¾ < 0).
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Consider the matrix G = [gij]. This is a zero diagonal and non-negative square matrix. We
interpret it as the adjacency matrix of a network g that re‡ects the pattern of existing payo¤
(relative) complementarities across all pairs of players. When ¾ij = ¾ji, for all i;j, the matrix G
is symmetric and the network g is un-directed. When, moreover, cross e¤ects only take two values,
that is, ¾ij 2 f¾;¾g, for all i 6= j with ¾ · 0, then G is a symmetric (0;1)¡matrix and the network
g is un-directed and un-weighted. In this case, g can be represented by a graph without loops nor
multiple links,8 where nodes stand for players and two nodes i and j are directly linked if and only
if e¤orts are relative strategic complements across these two players, that is, ¾ij = ¾ji = ¾.
Finally, we write the (common) second order derivative in own e¤orts as @2ui=@x2
i = ¾ = ¡¯¡°,
where ¯ > 0. Given our assumption that ¾ < minf¾;0g, this is without loss of generality.
8A loop is a single direct link starting at i and ending at i, that is, gii = 1. A direct link between i and j is multiple
when gij 2 f2;3;:::g. The matrix G is zero diagonal, thus ruling out loops. Besides, 0 · gij · 1 by construction,
thus ruling out multiple links. It is important to note, though, that our results also hold for networks with loops
and/or multiple links, but the economic intuitions are less appealing in this case.
5Proposition 1 Let I be the n¡square identity matrix, and U the n¡square matrix of ones. Then:
§ = ¡ ¯I ¡ °U + ¸G; (2)
with ¯ > 0, ° ¸ 0 and ¸ > 0.
Proof. From the de…nition of ¯;°;¸ and G.
The pattern of bilateral in‡uences results from the combination of an idiosyncratic e¤ect, a
global interaction e¤ect, and a local interdependence component.
The idiosyncratic e¤ect re‡ects (part of) the concavity of the payo¤ function in own e¤orts.
The global interaction e¤ect is uniform across all players (matrix U) and corresponds to a sub-
stitutability e¤ect across all pairs of players with value ¡° · 0. The local interaction component
captures the (relative) strategic complementarity in e¤orts that varies across pairs of players, with
maximal strength ¸ and population pattern re‡ected by G. The whole heterogeneity in § is thus
captured by G.
Let § be a matrix of cross e¤ects for some bilinear payo¤ functions (1). Following the decom-
position of § in (2), we rewrite these payo¤s as:
ui(x1;:::;xn) = ®xi ¡
1
2
(¯ ¡ °)x2
i ¡ °
n X
j=1
xixj +¸
n X
j=1
gijxixj; for all i = 1;:::;n: (3)
Let ¸¤ = ¸=¯ denote the strength of local interactions relative to self-concavity.
2.3 The Bonacich network centrality measure
Before turning to the equilibrium analysis, we de…ne a network centrality measure due to Bonacich
(1987) that proves useful for our analysis.
The n¡square adjacency matrix G of a network g keeps track of the direct connections in this
network. Indeed, two players i and j are directly connected in g if and only if gij > 0, in which
case 0 · gij · 1 measures the weight associated to this direct connection.
Let Gk be the kth power of this adjacency matrix with coe¢cients g
[k]
ij , where k is some non-
zero integer. This matrix keeps track of the indirect connections in the network. Indeed, g
[k]
ij ¸ 0
measures the number of paths of length k ¸ 1 in g between i and j.9 In particular, G0 = I, that
is, g
[0]
ii = 1 and g
[0]
ij = 0 for all i 6= j.
9A path of length k from i to j in g is a sequence hi0;i1;:::;iki of players such that i0 = i, ik = j, ip 6= ip+1, and
gipip+1 > 0, for all 0 · p · k ¡ 1, that is, players ip and ip+1 are directly linked in g. In fact, g
[k]
ij accounts for the
total weight of all paths of length k, from i to j. When the network is un-weighted, that is, G is a (0;1)¡matrix,
g
[k]
ij is simply the number of paths of length k from i to j.
6Given a scalar a ¸ 0 and a network g, we de…ne the following matrix:
M(g;a) = [I¡aG]
¡1 =
+1 X
k=0
akGk:
Note that these expressions are all well-de…ned for low enough values of a.10 The parameter a is a
decay factor that scales down the relative weight of longer paths.
Provided the matrix M(g;a) is non-negative, its coe¢cients mij(g;a) =
P+1
k=0 akg
[k]
ij count the
number of paths in g starting at i and ending at j, where paths of length k are weighted by ak.
Let 1 be the n¡dimensional vector of ones.
De…nition 1 Consider a network g with adjacency n¡square matrix G and a scalar a such that
M(g;a) = [I¡aG]
¡1 is well-de…ned and non-negative. The vector of Bonacich centralities of
parameter a in g is:
b(g;a) = [I¡aG]
¡1 ¢ 1:
The Bonacich centrality of node i is bi(g;a) =
Pn
j=1 mij(g;a), and counts the total number of
paths in g starting from i.11 It is the sum of all loops mii(g;a) starting from i and ending at i,
and all outer paths
P
j6=i mij(g;a) that connect i to every other player j 6= i, that is:
bi(g;a) = mii(g;a) +
X
j6=i
mij(g;a):
By de…nition, mii(g;a) ¸ 1, and thus bi(g;a) ¸ 1, with equality when a = 0.
3 Nash equilibrium and Bonacich centrality
3.1 Characterization and uniqueness
We now characterize a Nash equilibrium of the game §, where equilibrium strategies are propor-
tional to Bonacich centralities in the network of local complementarities g derived from §. We
provide conditions such that this equilibrium is unique and interior.
Consider a matrix of cross e¤ects § decomposed as in Proposition 1. From now on, we focus
on symmetric matrices such that ¾ij = ¾ji, for all j 6= i. Then, the largest eigenvalue ¹1(G) of G,
10Take a smaller than the norm of the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of G.
11In fact, b(g;a) is obtained from Bonacich (1987)’s measure by an a¢ne transformation. Bonacich de…nes the
following network centrality measure:
h(g;a;b) = b[I ¡ aG]
¡1 G ¢ 1:
Therefore, b(g;a) = 1+ah(g;a;1) = 1 + k(g;a), where k(g;a) is an early measure of network status introduced by
Katz (1953). See also Guimerà et al. (2001) for a related network centrality measures.
7sometimes referred to as the index of the network g, is well-de…ned. Also, ¹1(G) > 0 as long as
¾ij 6= 0, for some j 6= i.12
For all vector y 2IRn, denote by y = y1 + ::: + yn the sum of its coordinates.
Theorem 1 The matrix [¯I ¡ ¸G]
¡1 is well-de…ned and non-negative if and only if ¯ > ¸¹1(G).
Then, the game § has a unique Nash equilibrium x¤(§), which is interior and given by:
x¤ (§) =
®
¯ + °b(g;¸¤)
b(g;¸¤): (4)
Proof. The necessary and su¢cient condition for [¯I ¡ ¸G]
¡1 to be well-de…ned and non-
negative derives from Theorem III¤, page 601 in Debreu and Herstein (1953).
An interior Nash equilibrium in pure strategies x¤ 2 IRn
+ is such that @ui=@xi(x¤) = 0 and
x¤
i > 0, for all i = 1;:::;n. If such an equilibrium exists it then solves:
¡§ ¢ x = [¯I + °U ¡ ¸G] ¢ x = ®1: (5)
The matrix ¯I+°U¡¸G is generically non-singular, and (5) has a unique generic solution in IRn,
denoted by x¤.13 Using the fact that U ¢ x¤=x¤1, (5) is equivalent to:
[I ¡ ¸¤G] ¢ x¤ =
® ¡ °x¤
¯
1 , x¤ =
® ¡ °x¤
¯
b(g;¸¤);
and (4) follows by simple algebra. Given that ® > 0 and bi(g;¸¤) ¸ 1, for all i, it follows that x¤
is interior.
We now establish uniqueness. First, the previous argument shows that x¤ is a unique interior
equilibrium. We deal with corner solutions.
Denote by ¯(§);°(§);¸(§) and G(§) the elements from the decomposition of § in Proposition
1. We omit the dependence in § when there is no confusion. For all matrix Y, vector y and set
S ½ f1;:::;ng, YS is the sub-matrix of Y with rows and columns in S, and yS is the sub-vector of
y with rows in S.
Let S ½ f1;:::;ng. Then °(§S) · °(§);¯(§S) ¸ ¯(§) and ¸(§S) · ¸(§). Also, ¸G =
§ + °(U ¡ I) ¡ ¾I, and the coe¢cients in the S rows and columns of ¸G are at least as high as
the corresponding coe¢cients in ¸(§S)GS. Theorem I¤, page 600 in Debreu and Herstein (1953)
then implies that ¹1(¸(§S)GS) · ¹1(¸(§)G). Therefore, ¯(§) > ¸(§)¹1(G) implies ¯(§S) >
¸(§S)¹1(GS).
Let y¤ be a non-interior Nash equilibrium of the game §. Let S ½ f1;:::;ng such that y¤
i = 0
if and only if i 2 NnS. Therefore, y¤
i > 0, for all i 2 S. Note that S 6= ;, as @ui=@xi(0) = ® > 0,
12Note that G is symmetric from the symmetry of §. By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, the eigenvalues of a
symmetric matrix G are all real numbers. Also, the matrix G with all zeros in the diagonal has a trace equal to zero.
Therefore, ¹1(G) > 0 whenever G 6= 0.
13The set of parameters ¯;°;¸ for which det(¯I + °U ¡ ¸G) = 0 has Lebesgue measure zero in IR
3.
8and 0 cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Then,
¡§S ¢ y¤
S = [¯IS + °US ¡ ¸GS] ¢ y¤
S = ®1S:
Given that ¯(§S) > ¸(§S)¹1(GS), we have:
y¤
S =
® ¡ °y¤
S
¯
b(gS;¸¤): (6)
Now, every player i 2 NnS is best-responding with y¤
i = 0, so that:
@ui
@xi
(y¤) = ® +
X
j2S
¾ijy¤
j = ® ¡ °y¤
S + ¸
X
j2S
gijy¤
j · 0, for all i 2 NnS,
where the last equality uses the decomposition of §. Using (6), we rewrite this inequality as:
(® ¡ °y¤
S)(1 + ¸¤ X
j2S
gijbj(gS;¸¤)) · 0, equivalent to ® ¡ °y¤
S · 0.
Using (6), we conclude that y¤
i · 0, for all i 2 S, which is a contradiction.
When the matrix of cross e¤ects § reduces to ¸G (that is, ¯ = ° = 0), the game § is super-
modular and we have a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. If, instead, this matrix reduces to ¡¯I¡°U
(that is, ¸ = 0), the equilibrium is generically unique. The condition in Theorem 1 requires that the
parameter for own-concavity ¯ to be high enough to counter the payo¤ complementarity captured
by ¸¹1(G). Here, ¸ has to do with the level and ¹1(G) with the population-wide pattern of positive
cross e¤ects. Note that this condition does not impose any bound on the absolute values for these
cross e¤ects, but only on their relative magnitude.
The Bonacich-equilibrium expression (4) also implies that:
x¤
i(§) =
bi(g;¸¤)
b(g;¸¤)
x¤(§):
Each player contributes to the aggregate equilibrium outcome in proportion to her network central-
ity. The dependence of individual outcomes on group behavior is referred to as peer e¤ects. Here,
this intragroup externality is not an average in‡uence. It is heterogeneous across members, with a
variance related to the Bonacich network centrality.
Remark 1 Consider the general game (§;®), where ®i > 0 di¤ers across players. Then, (4)
still holds where ®b(g;¸¤) is replaced by the weighted Bonacich centrality measure b®(g;¸¤) =
[I¡¸¤G]
¡1 ¢ ®.
Remark 2 In the proof of Theorem 1, the symmetry of § does not play any explicit role but for
the existence and positivity of the largest eigenvalue of G. Therefore, the Bonacich-Nash linkage
holds for any asymmetric matrix § of cross e¤ects with a well-de…ned positive spectral radius.14
14Debreu and Hernstein (1953) provide some general conditions for a matrix to have a well-de…ned and positive
spectral radius.
9When g is an un-directed and un-weighted network, the condition in Theorem 1 can be expressed
directly in terms of the number of nodes and links in g, thus dispensing with computing the network
index.
Let g =
P
i;j gij be the sum of all direct links in g. When G is a (0;1)¡ matrix, this is twice
the number of direct links in the un-directed and un-weighted network g.
Corollary 1 Suppose that ¾ij 2 f¾;¾g, for all i 6= j with ¾ · 0, and that the network g induced
by the decomposition of § in (2) is connected. If ¯ > ¸
p
g + n ¡ 1, the only Nash equilibrium of
the game § is given by (4).
Proof. From the upper bound on the index of a connected graph in Theorem 1.5, page 5 in
Cvetkovi´ c and Rowlinson (1990).
3.2 Comparative statics
The previous results relate individual equilibrium outcomes to the Bonacich centrality in the net-
work g of local complementarities. The next result establishes a positive relationship between the
aggregate equilibrium outcome and the pattern of local complementarities.
For any two matrices § and §0, we write §0 ° § if ¾0
ij ¸ ¾ij, for all i;j, with at least one strict
inequality.
Theorem 2 Let § and §0 symmetric such that §0 ° §. If ¯ > ¸¹1(G) and ¯0 > ¸0¹1(G0) for the
decompositions (2) of § and §0, then x¤(§0) > x¤(§).
Proof. When §0 > §, we write §0 = §+¸D, with dij ¸ 0 with at least one strict inequality,
and ¸ given by the decomposition (2) of §. If ¯ > ¸¹1(G) and ¯0 > ¸0¹1(G0), Theorem 1 holds, so
that ¡§ ¢ x¤(§) = ¡§0 ¢ x¤(§0) = ®1, and x¤(§);x¤(§0) > 0. We compute ¡x¤t(§
0) ¢ § ¢ x¤(§) in
two di¤erent ways. First, ¡x¤t(§
0)¢§¢x¤(§) =®x¤t(§
0)¢1 = ®x¤(§
0). Second, using the symmetry
of §0, we have:
¡x¤t(§
0) ¢ § ¢ x¤(§) = ¡x¤t(§
0) ¢ §0 ¢ x¤(§) + ¸x¤t(§
0) ¢ D ¢ x¤(§)
= ®x¤(§) + ¸x¤t(§
0) ¢ D ¢ x¤(§):
Using the fact that ® > 0, we conclude that x¤(§
0) >x¤(§).
In words, the denser the pattern of local complementarities, the higher the aggregate outcome,
as players can rip more complementarities in g0 than in g. The geometric intuition for this result
is clear. Recall that b(g;¸¤) counts the total number of weighted paths in g. This is obviously an
increasing function in g (for the inclusion ordering), as more links imply more such paths.
10Remark 3 When the decompositions (2) of § and §0 are such that (®;¯;°;¸) = (®0;¯0;°0;¸0) and
G0 ° G, then ¯0 > ¸0¹1(G0) implies that ¯ > ¸¹1(G).15
4 A network-based policy
4.1 Finding the key player
In our model, individual equilibrium behavior is tightly rooted in the network structure through
(4). The removal of a player from the population, holding the pattern of social interactions among
the other players …xed, alters the whole distribution of outcomes.
We provide a simple geometric criterion to identify the optimal target in the population when
the planner wishes to reduce (or to increase) optimally the aggregate group outcome.16
In what follows, we suppose that § is symmetric with ¾ij 2 f¾;¾g for all i 6= j, and ¾ · 0.
In this case, the decomposition of § in (2) yields a (0;1)¡adjacency matrix G and an un-weighted
and un-directed network g, with its corresponding graph representation.
Let’s eliminate some player i from the current population. Suppose that for each possible value
v 2 f¾;¾g for the cross e¤ects, there exists at least two di¤erent pairs of players (i;j) and (i0;j0),
di¤ering two-by-two, such that ¾ij = ¾i0j0 = v. This is a mild requirement that guarantees that
the values of ¯, ° and ¸ in the decomposition (2) of § do not change for any such single player
removal. The adjacency matrix becomes G¡i, obtained from G by setting to zero all of its ith row
and column coe¢cients. The resulting network is g¡i.17
Similarly, denote by §¡i the matrix that results from removing the ith row and column from
§.
The planner’s problem is to reduce x¤(§) optimally by picking the adequate player from the
population.18 Formally, she solves maxfx¤(§) ¡x¤(§¡i) j i = 1;:::;ng, equivalent to:
minfx¤(§¡i) j i = 1;:::;ng (7)
This is a …nite optimization problem, that admits at least one solution.
Let i¤ be a solution to (7). We call player i¤ the key player. Removing i¤ from the initial
network g has the highest overall impact on the aggregate equilibrium level. We provide a simple
15From the monotonicity of the largest eigenvalue with the coe¢cients of the matrix in Theorem I
¤, page 600 in
Debreu and Hernstein (1953).
16Bollobás and Riordan (2003) contains a mathematical analysis of the relative network disruption e¤ects of a
topological attack versus random failures in large networks. See also Albert et al. (2000) for a numerical analysis for
the case of the World Wide Web.
17If the primitive of our model is the bilinear expression for the payo¤s in (1), the key player analysis applies to
matrix of cross e¤ects § symmetric and for which the ¾ijs only take two possible values, that is, ¾ij 2 f¾;¾g with
¾ · 0. In this case, G is a (0;1)¡matrix. If, instead, the primitive of our model is the expression for the payo¤s in
(3), the key player analysis carries over to any symmetric adjacency matrix G with 0 · gij · 1.
18Corollary 1 below considers the symmetric case where the planner wishes to increase x
¤(g;¸
¤) optimally.
11and direct geometric characterization of the key player.
De…nition 2 Consider a network g with adjacency n¡square matrix G and a scalar a such that
M(g;a) = [I¡aG]
¡1 is well-de…ned and non-negative. The inter-centrality of player i of parameter
a in g is:
ci(g;a) =
b2
i(g;a)
mii(g;a)
:
The Bonacich centrality of player i counts the number of paths in g stemming from i, while the
inter-centrality computes the total number of such paths that hit i at some time. It is the sum of i’s
Bonacich centrality and i’s contribution to every other player Bonacich centrality. Holding bi(g;¸¤)
…xed, ci(g;¸¤) decreases with the proportion mii=bi of i’s Bonacich centrality due to self-loops.
Theorem 3 If ¯ > ¸¹1(G), the key player i¤ that solves minfx¤(§¡i) j i = 1;:::;ng is the one
with the highest inter-centrality measure of parameter ¸¤ in g, that is, ci¤(g;¸¤) ¸ ci(g;¸¤), for all
i = 1;:::;n.19
Proof. We …rst prove a useful result.
Lemma 1 Let a > 0 such that M(g;a) = [I¡aG]
¡1 is well-de…ned and non-negative. Then,
mij(g;a)mik(g;a) = mii(g;a)
£
mjk(g;a) ¡ mjk(g¡i;a)
¤
.
Proof of the Lemma. First note that the symmetry of § implies that mjk(g;a) = mkj(g;a),
for all j;k and g. We have:
mii(g;a)
£
mjk(g;a) ¡ mjk(g¡i;a)
¤
=
+1 X
p=1
ap X
r+s=p
r¸0;s¸1
g
[r]
ii
³
g
[s]
jk ¡ g
[s]
j(i0)k
´
=
+1 X
p=1
ap X
r+s=p
r¸0;s¸2
g
[r]
ii g
[s]
j(i)k
=
+1 X
p=1
ap X
r0+s0=p
r0¸1;s0¸1
g
[r0]
ji g
[s0]
ik = mji(g;a)mik(g;a);
where g
[s]
j(i0)k (resp. g
[s]
j(i)k) is the compound weight of length¡s paths from j to k not containing i
(resp. containing i), and g
[0]
ii = 1. Q.E.D.
First, note that ¹1(G) ¸ ¹1(G¡i). Therefore, if M(g;¸¤) is well-de…ned and non-negative (as
implied by the condition in Theorem 1), so is M(g¡i;¸¤), for all i = 1;:::;n.
With ® > 0, x¤(§¡i) increases in b(g¡i;¸¤), and (7) is equivalent to minfb(g¡i;¸¤) j i =
1;:::;ng. De…ne:
bji(g;¸¤) = bj(g;¸¤) ¡bj(g¡i;¸¤), for all j 6= i.
19Note that there may be more than just one key player.
12This is the contribution of i to j’s Bonacich centrality in g. Summing over all j 6= i, and adding
bi(g;¸¤) to both sides gives:
b(g;¸¤) ¡ b(g¡i;¸¤) = bi(g;¸¤) +
X
j6=i
bji(g;¸¤) ´ di(g;¸¤).
The solution of (7) is i¤ such that di¤(g;¸¤) ¸ di(g;¸¤), for all i = 1;:::;n. We have:
di(g;¸¤) = bi(g;¸¤) +
X
j6=i
£
bj(g;¸¤) ¡ bj(g¡i;¸¤)
¤
= bi(g;¸¤) +
X
j6=i
n X
k=1
£
mjk(g;¸¤) ¡ mjk(g¡i;¸¤)
¤
:
Using Lemma 1, this becomes:
di(g;¸¤) = bi(g;¸¤) +
X
j6=i
n X
k=1
mij(g;a)mik(g;a)
mii(g;a)
= bi(g;¸¤)
2
41 +
X
j6=i
mij(g;a)
mii(g;a)
3
5 =
b2
i(g;¸¤)
mii(g;¸¤)
:
Example 1 Consider the network g in Figure 2 with eleven players.
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Figure 2
There are three di¤erent locations in this network: player 1, players 2, 6, 7 and 11, and players
3, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10. Type¡1 and type¡3 players have four direct links, while type ¡2 players
have …ve. Player 1 bridges together two fully intra-connected communities of …ve players each. By
removing player 1, the network is maximally disrupted. By removing a type¡2 player, we get a
network with the lowest total number of links.
Table 1 computes the Bonacich and inter-centrality measures for di¤erent values of the decay
factor a. A superscript star identi…es the highest column value.20
20Here, the highest value for ¸
¤ compatible with our de…nition of centrality measures is
2
3+
p
41 ' 0:213:
13a 0.1 0.2
Player Type bi ci bi ci
1 1:75 2:92 8:33 41:67¤
2 1:88¤ 3:28¤ 9:17¤ 40:33
3 1:72 2:79 7:78 32:67
Table 1
Type¡2 players have the highest Bonacich centrality. They have the highest number of direct
connections and are directly connected to the bridge player 1, who gives them access to a wide span
of indirect connections. When a is low, they are also the key players. When a is high, though, the
most active players are not the key players anymore. Now, indirect e¤ects matter, and eliminating
player 1 has the highest joint direct and indirect e¤ect on aggregate outcome.
Corollary 2 If ¯ > ¸¹1(G), the key player i¤ that solves maxfx¤(§¡i) j i = 1;:::;ng is the one
with the lowest inter-centrality measure of parameter ¸¤ in g, that is, ci¤(g;¸¤) · ci(g;¸¤), for all
i = 1;:::;n.
Remark 4 When § is not symmetric, Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 still hold where the intercentral-
ity measure is now given by e ci(g;a) = bi(g;a)(
Pn
j=1 mji(g;a))=mii(g;a).
5 Applications
In this section, we propose three di¤erent applications of the previous results
5.1 Crime networks
There are n criminals, each exerting a level of crime xi that results from a trade o¤ between the
costs and bene…ts of criminal activities. The expected utility of criminal i is:
ui(x;r) = yi(x) ¡ pi(x;r)f; (8)
where yi(x) are the proceeds, pi(x;r) the apprehension probability, and f the corresponding …ne.
Following Ballester et al. (2004) and Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004), the cost of committing
crime pi(x;r)f increases with xi, as the apprehension probability increases with one’s involvement
in crime, hitherto, with one’s exposure to deterrence.
Also, and consistent with standard criminology theories, criminals improve illegal practice
through interactions with their direct criminal mates.21 Formally, criminals are connected through
21See, e.g., Sutherland (1947).
14a friendship network r, where rij = 1 when i and j are directly related to each other. For instance,
let:
8
<
:
yi (x) = xi
h
1 ¡ ´
Pn
j=1xj
i
pi(x;r) = p0xi
h
1 ¡ º
Pn
j=1rijxj
i :
The expected utility then becomes:
ui(x;r) = (1 ¡ ¼)xi ¡ ´
n X
j=1
xixj + ¼º
n X
j=1
rijxixj; (9)
where ¼ = p0f is the marginal expected punishment cost for an isolated criminal, and ¡´ < 0
captures a congestion in the crime market. The utility function (9) coincides with the expression in
(3) with ® = 1¡¼, ¯ = ° = ´, ¸ = ¼º and g = r. When ¼º¹1(r) < ´, the unique Nash equilibrium
of the crime game with payo¤s (9) is:
x¤ =
1 ¡ ¼
´
1
1 + b(r;¼º
´)
b(r;¼
º
´
):
Here, the key player policy in Theorem 3 has both a direct and an indirect e¤ect on crime reduction.
On the contrary, a standard deterrence policy (an increase in ¼) has a positive direct impact on
crime reduction, but a negative indirect e¤ect, as criminals now counter the extra deterrence they
face by strengthening their network interactions.
5.2 R&D collaboration networks
Consider a standard Cournot game with n (ex ante) identical …rms, each of them choosing the
quantity qi. As in Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) and Goyal and Joshi (2003), …rms can form
bilateral agreements to jointly invest in cost-reducing R&D activities. We set cij = 1 when …rms
i and j set up a collaboration link. Firm i’s marginal cost is ¸0 ¡ ¸
P
j6=i rijqj. Here, ¸0 > 0,
represents the marginal cost of an isolated …rm, while ¸ > 0 is the cost reduction induced by each
link it forms. With a linear inverse demand, the pro…t function of …rm i is:
ui(x;r) =
2
4Á¡
n X
j=1
qj
3
5qi ¡
2
4¸0 ¡ ¸
X
j6=i
rijqj
3
5qi = (Á ¡ ¸0)qi¡
n X
j=1
qiqj +¸
X
j6=i
rijqiqj: (10)
Again, this objective function is a particular case of (3), where ® = Á ¡ ¸0 > 0, ¯ = ° = 1 and
g = r. Using Corollary 1, we conclude that the Cournot game with payo¤s (10) has a unique Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies:
q¤ =
Á ¡ ¸0
1 + b(r;¸)
b(r;¸);
15when 1 > ¸
p
g + n ¡ 1. In particular, Theorem 2 implies that the overall industry output increases
when the network of collaboration links expands, irrespective of this network geometry and the
number of additional links. For the case of a linear inverse demand curve, this generalizes the
…ndings in Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) and Goyal and Joshi (2003), where monotonicity of
industry output is established for the case of regular collaboration networks, where each …rm forms
the same number of bilateral agreements. For such regular networks, links are added as multiples
of n, as all …rms’ connections are increased simultaneously.
5.3 Conformism and social norms
There are n players whose well-being depends on their behavior compared to that of their reference
group. More precisely, each player chooses an action xi ¸ 0 and loses utility when failing to
conform to the social norm of his reference group, equal to the average action of its members. This
framework encompasses a variety of issues where conformism is the driving force for individual
behavior.22 Here, contrarily to previous models, we allow for the reference group, and its induced
social norm, to vary with the friendship and community ties of each player.
Formally, when i and j are friends we set fij = 1. Let also fii = 0 for all i. This collection of
links constitutes a network f. Player i has fi =
Pn
j=1fij direct links in f, whose average action is
xi =
Pn
j=1fijxj=fi. This is the social norm of player i. We assume that fi > 0, for all i.
Consider the following utility function, with »;®;µ;d > 0:
ui(x;f) = » + ®xi ¡ µx2
i ¡ d(xi ¡ xi)2: (11)
In words, non-conformist behavior entails a quadratic utility loss. When f is the complete network
with self-loops, this is equation (5) in Akerlof (1997), page 1009. We have:
@2ui(x;f)
@xi@xj
=
8
> <
> :
¡2(µ + d), when i = j
0, when i 6= j and fij = 0
2d=fi > 0, when i 6= j and fij = 1
:
This utility function (11) thus coincides with (3) with ¯ = 2(µ+d), ° = 0, ¸ = 2d and gij = fij=fi.
Note that g is a row-normalization of the initial friendship network f, as illustrated in the following
example, where F and G are the adjacency matrices of, respectively, f and g.
Example 2 Consider the following friendship network f:
t t t
2 1 3
22Di¤erent issues have been explored in the literature. For example, and to name a few, (i) peer pressures and
partnerships, when individuals are penalized for working less than the group norm (Kandel and Lazear 1992), (ii)
religion, when the bene…ts of praying increase with the number of participants (Iannaccone 1992, Berman 2000), (iii)
social status and social distance, when deviations from the social norm imply a loss of reputation and status (Akerlof
1980 and 1997 and Bernheim 1994, among others).
16Then,
F =
2
6
4
0 1 1
1 0 0
1 0 0
3
7
5 and G =
2
6
4
0 1=2 1=2
1 0 0
1 0 0
3
7
5
If µ > (n ¡ 2)d,23 this conformity game with payo¤s (11) has a unique Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies given by:
x¤ =
®
2(µ + d)
b
µ
g;
d
µ + d
¶
:
6 Discussion and extensions
We discuss a number of possible extensions of this work.
First, our analysis is restricted to linear-quadratic utility functions that capture linear exter-
nalities in players’ actions. First order conditions for interior equilibria then produce a system of
linear equations that leads to the Bonacich-Nash linkage. Suppose, instead, that externalities are
non-linear, and that utility functions u are C2. Let §(x¤) be the (symmetric) Jacobian of ru
evaluated at an interior Nash equilibrium x¤ > 0. Decompose §(x¤) as in (2). Then, by a simple
continuity argument, the …rst order approximation of x¤ corresponds to the Bonacich centrality
vector for this decomposition.
Second, Theorem 3 characterizes the key player when the planner’s objective function is the
aggregate group outcome x¤(§). Suppose, instead, that the planner’s objective is to maximize the
welfare function W¤(§) =
Pn
i=1ui(x¤(§)). Simple algebra gives 2W¤(§) = (¯ + °)
Pn
i=1 x¤
i(§)2
and, when ° = 0, this becomes 2¯W¤(§) = ®2Pn
i=1 bi(g;¸¤)2. A geometric characterization of
the key player is also possible in this case. The building block is provided by Lemma 1, which
characterizes all the path changes in a network when a node is removed. The network index
obtained in this case is less intuitive than the inter-centrality measure, as it now accounts for
individual direct contributions to the aggregate outcome, indirect contributions, and the variance
of the latter.
Third, Theorem 3 characterizes geometrically single player targets, but the inter-centrality
measure can be generalized to a group index.24 Note that the group target selection problem is not
amenable to a sequential key player problem. For instance, the key group of size 2 in Example 1
when a = 0:2 is f2;7g, rather than the sequential optimal pair f1;2g.
Fourth, beyond the optimal player removal problem, the network policy analysis can also ac-
commodate more general optimal targeted tax or subsidy problems. Consider a population of n+1
agents i = 0;1;:::;n and a matrix of cross e¤ects § with associated network g in (2). Suppose that
23Here, we use the fact that ¹1(G) · ¹1(F) · n ¡ 1.
24See Ballester et al. (2004).
17the planner holds the outcome of player i = 0 to some …xed exogenous value s 2 IR. The case
s > 0 (resp. s < 0) is a subsidy (resp. tax), while s = 0 corresponds to the key player problem
solved above. Players i = 1;:::;n then play an n¡player game with interior Bonacich-Nash equi-
librium x¤
¡0(§¡0;s). Denote by g0 the n¡dimensional column vector with coordinates g01;:::;g0n
that keeps track of player 0’s direct contacts in g, let ®¤ = ®=¯ and °¤ = °=¯. Then, the total
equilibrium population outcome is s + x¤
¡0(§¡0;s), where:
x¤
¡0(§¡0;s) =
1
1 + °¤b(g¡0;¸¤)
[(®¤ ¡ s)b(g¡0;¸¤) + ¸¤sbg0(g¡0;¸¤)]:
Here, bg0(g¡0;¸¤) is the aggregate weighted Bonacich centrality de…ned in Remark 1. Given an
objective function related to the total population output s +x¤
¡0(§¡0;s), and a set of constraints,
the planner’s problem is to …x optimally the value of s and the target identity i. Holding s
constant, the choice of the optimal target is a simple …nite optimization problem. In particular,
when s = 0 and the planner wants to minimize the overall output, the solution to this problem is
i¤ 2 argmaxfci(g;¸¤) j i = 1;:::;ng.
Finally, the analysis so far deals with a …xed network. When G is a (0;1)¡matrix, we can
easily endogenize the network with a two-stage game the following way. In the …rst stage, players
decide simultaneously to stay in the network or to drop out of it (and get their outside option).
This is modelled as a simple binary decision. In the second stage, the players that stay play the
network game on the resulting network. Uniqueness of the second-stage Nash equilibrium and its
closed-form expression crucially simplify the analysis of this two-stage game. See, e.g, Ballester et
al. (2004) and Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) for analysis along this vein.
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